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Abstract. The debate on the epistemology of disagreement has so far focused almost exclusively on cases 
of disagreement between individual persons. Yet, many social epistemologists agree that at least certain 
kinds of groups are equally capable of having beliefs that are open to epistemic evaluation. If so, we should 
expect a comprehensive epistemology of disagreement to accommodate cases of disagreement between 
group agents, such as juries, governments, companies, and the like. However, this raises a number of 
fundamental questions concerning what it means for groups to be epistemic peers and to disagree with 
each other. In this paper, we explore what group peer disagreement amounts to given that we think of 
group belief in terms of List and Pettit’s (2002; 2011) ‘belief aggregation model’. We then discuss how the 
so-called ‘equal weight view’ of peer disagreement is best accommodated within this framework. The 
account that seems most promising to us says, roughly, that the parties to a group peer disagreement 
should adopt the belief that results from applying the most suitable belief aggregation function for the 
combined group on all members of the combined group. To motivate this view, we test it against various 
intuitive cases, derive some of its notable implications, and discuss how it relates to the equal weight view 
of individual peer disagreement. 
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1. Introduction 
How, if at all, should the parties to a peer disagreement revise their beliefs about the disputed 
proposition? This question has received a lot of attention in recent social epistemology. 
However, the debate has so far focused almost exclusively on cases of peer disagreement 
between individual persons. This is somewhat surprising given that many social 
epistemologists agree that at least certain kinds of groups are equally capable of having beliefs 
that are open to epistemic evaluation.1 To the extent that this view of group belief is correct, 
we should expect a comprehensive epistemology of disagreement to accommodate cases of 
disagreement between group agents, such as juries, governments, companies, and the like. 
                                                      
1 For proponents of this view,  see Gilbert (1987), List and Pettit (2002; 2011), Schmitt (2014), among others. For 
critical discussions, see Hakli (2006) and Wray (2001; 2007). 
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There are, however, a number of challenges associated with the attempt to extend 
theories of individual disagreement to the case of group disagreement. Carter (2014) has 
recently drawn attention to a set of problems that arise for anyone who aspires to develop a 
‘conciliatorist’ theory of group peer disagreement. Furthermore, as we shall see, there are a 
number of fundamental conceptual issues concerning what it means for two groups to be 
epistemic peers and to disagree with each other in the first place. As such, the problem of 
group peer disagreement is not simply a trivial extension of the problem of individual peer 
disagreement, but deserves sustained attention in its own right. 
The aim of this paper is to clarify various conceptual issues concerning group peer 
disagreement, explore the question of how the parties to a group peer disagreement should 
revise their beliefs, and discuss how the problem of group peer disagreement relates to the 
problem of individual peer disagreement. We will base our investigation on two core 
assumptions. First, we will assume that a group’s belief state can be represented as the output 
of a belief aggregation function that takes the belief states of the individual group members as 
input. This ‘aggregation model’ of group belief has been systematically developed by List and 
Pettit (2002; 2011), and has been used to investigate a variety of topics, ranging from the 
epistemic merits of co-authorship in science (Bright et al. 2017) to the role of deliberation in 
democratic societies (Pettit 2001).2 Second, we will assume that a theory of group peer 
disagreement should respect the basic intuition behind the equal weight view of individual 
peer disagreement, according to which the parties to an individual peer disagreement should 
place ‘equal weight’ on each other’s opinions. This view has been prominently defended by 
Christensen (2007) and Elga (2007) and remains a popular view of individual peer 
disagreement. That being said, neither of our two core assumptions are uncontroversial, and 
those who reject either or both assumptions will perhaps find our investigation fundamentally 
misguided.3 Nevertheless, we will not defend our basic assumptions here. Our aim is not to 
derive a theory of group peer disagreement from first principles, but to explore what an equal 
weight view of group peer disagreement should look like within a belief aggregation 
framework. Needless to say, the results of our investigation will be no more plausible than the 
                                                      
2 See also Goldman (2011) who uses the aggregation model of group belief to investigate the question of what 
makes a group belief epistemically justified. 
3 For a prominent critic of the equal weight view, see Kelly (2010). For criticism of the aggregation model of group 
belief, see Magnus (2013) who argues that the aggregation framework cannot adequately represent what the 
scientific community knows collectively. 
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assumptions on which our investigation is based. But we hope that many will find the 
aggregation framework and the equal weight view plausible enough to serve as the basis of a 
worthwhile investigation. For those who are skeptical about our assumptions, it may still be 
of interest what they entail with respect to group peer disagreement. 
We shall proceed as follows. In §2, we offer a more detailed characterization of what 
group peer disagreement amounts to within a belief aggregation framework. In §3, we then 
formulate and evaluate three candidate views of group peer disagreement that one might take 
to encode the basic idea behind the equal weight view of individual peer disagreement. The 
view that seems most promising to us says, roughly, that the parties to a group peer 
disagreement should adopt the belief that results from applying the most suitable belief 
aggregation function for the combined group on all members of the combined group. To 
motivate this view, we test it against various intuitive cases, derive some of its notable 
implications, and discuss how it relates to the equal weight view of individual peer 
disagreement. In §4, we defend the proposed view against a number of objections. Finally, §5 
is a brief summary. 
2. Characterizing Group Peer Disagreement 
The aim of this section is to investigate what group peer disagreement more precisely amounts 
to within a belief aggregation framework. Let us begin by introducing the framework in a little 
more detail. The idea is to think of a group’s belief state as the result of applying a Belief 
Aggregation Function (BAF) to the set of individual belief states of the group’s members. 
While any mapping from sets of individual belief states to group belief states may in principle 
count as a BAF, we will try to illustrate our points using relatively simple and well-known 
BAFs such as dictatorship, majority voting, unanimity voting, and the like. A fully fledged 
aggregation model of group belief may well have to impose further constraints on what counts 
an admissible aggregation function. It might seem odd, for instance, to admit a BAF that 
results in a group belief that p just in case every group member disbelieves p. But for present 
purposes, we need not impose any constraints on which BAFs are admissible. 
As is standard in the belief aggregation literature, we will assume that groups as well as 
individuals have binary ‘all-or-nothing’ beliefs (rather than graded beliefs), and that each 
member of any given group either believes or disbelieves any given proposition. Otherwise 
we will not make any substantive assumptions about the nature of group belief. In particular, 
we will not assume a ‘summativist’ version of the aggregation framework, according to which 
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a group’s believing a proposition p is simply a matter of a sufficient percentage of its members’ 
believing that p.4 On the present picture, a group may in principle believe that p, even if only 
few (or none) of its members believe that p, depending on the group’s BAF. Also, we will not 
assume that a group’s BAF need be explicitly chosen, or deliberately adhered to, by its 
members.  Rather, a group’s BAF may be a tacit convention or otherwise implicit in the 
group’s practice. 
What does it mean for two groups to disagree on this picture? Trivially, two groups 
disagree about p if and only if the groups have differing beliefs about p. So, given that we have 
a model of group belief, we also have a model of group disagreement. Nevertheless, one might 
still wonder whether group disagreement depends in any systematic way on the presence or 
absence of individual disagreement among the group members. In particular, it might seem 
natural to think that two groups cannot disagree unless the groups have at least somewhat 
different belief distributions over their members. However, on the present picture, it turns out 
that differing belief distributions over the members of two groups is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the two groups to disagree. A simple illustration is given in Table 1. The groups 
G1 and G2 disagree, although they have identical belief profiles (in each group, two members 
believe p, and one member disbelieves p). Conversely, the groups G1 and G3 agree, although 
they have different belief profiles (all of G3’s members believe p, whereas this is not the case 
for G1). So the fact that two groups have differing belief profiles is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the presence of group disagreement. This is a direct consequence of the fact that 
a group’s belief state is not only a function of the belief states of its members, but also a 
function of the group’s BAF. 
It is worth noting that other views of group belief differ from the aggregation model in 
this respect. Consider, for example, a simple summativist view of group belief, according to 
which a group believes that p just in case a sufficient percentage of its members believe that p. 
On this sort of picture, there is a relatively straightforward connection between group 
disagreement and member disagreement: two groups disagree just in case there is sufficient 
disagreement among their members. We do not want to enter a discussion of whether this 
result is desirable or not. But in any case, it marks a central difference between the aggregation 
model of group belief and the summativist account. 
                                                      
4 See Gilbert (1987), Toumela (1992), and Schmitt (1994) for nonsummativist accounts of group belief. 
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 G1: Majority voting G2: Dictatorship (member 3) G3: Unanimity voting 
Member 1 True True True 
Member 2 True True True 
Member 3 False False True 
Group True False True 
Table 1: The groups G1 and G2 disagree, although they have identical belief profiles. Conversely, the groups G1 and 
G3 agree, although they have differing belief profiles. 
The next question we want to discuss is what it means for two groups to be epistemic 
peers on the present model. In the literature on individual peer disagreement, epistemic 
peerhood is often understood in terms of two agents being equally competent at judging a 
shared body of evidence.5 For example, two weather forecasters might be peers in virtue of 
having access to the same meteorological data and being equally competent at analyzing and 
drawing inferences from such data. However, this ‘evidentialist’ conception of epistemic 
peerhood does not seem to sit well with the aggregation model of group belief, since this 
model does not treat a group’s belief state as the result of a collective judgment of a body of 
evidence, which is available to the group as a whole. Rather, it treats a group’s belief state as 
the result of aggregating the set of individual belief states (which may in turn be understood 
as resulting from individual judgments of different bodies of evidence available to different 
group members). As such, the evidentialist conception of epistemic peerhood seems ill-suited 
for the purpose of reasoning about group peerhood. 
Instead, we will understand epistemic peerhood in reliabilist terms, where ‘reliability’ is 
to be understood as a measure of how well an agent’s beliefs tend to track the truth. This sort 
of reliabilist conception of epistemic peerhood has been discussed by Christensen (2016) and 
Lam (2011) in the context of individual peer disagreement, and has been used by Easwaran et 
al. (2016) to investigate how individuals should in general revise their credences upon 
learning the credences of other persons. Furthermore, philosophers who work within an 
aggregation framework often measure epistemic performance in reliabilist terms.6 
Nevertheless, we should not be taken to say that a reliabilist conception of epistemic peerhood 
                                                      
5 See, e.g., Christensen (2007), Levinstein (2015), and Rasmussen et al. (2017). 
6 See, e.g., List (2005) and Hartmann and Sprenger (2012). 
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is always (or even typically) preferable to its evidentialist cousin, nor do we want to enter a 
broad discussion of the merits and demerits of a reliabilist conception of epistemic peerhood. 
Instead, we hope to be able to show that a reliabilist conception of epistemic peerhood is at 
least useful for the purpose of reasoning about group peer disagreement. It is also worth 
noting that there need not be any deep opposition between reliabilist and evidentialist 
conceptions of peerhood. After all, it seems clear that an agent’s ability to judge the available 
evidence is in many cases indicative of the agent’s reliability, and vice versa. If so, there is at 
least a weak sense in which reliabilist and evidentialist conceptions of epistemic peerhood go 
hand in hand. 
How we should think about an agent’s reliability more precisely? In the belief 
aggregation literature, it is common to distinguish between an agent’s positive reliability, 
understood as the likelihood of believing p given that p is true, and an agent’s negative 
reliability, understood as the likelihood of not believing p given that p is false (see, e.g., List 
2005): 
Positive reliability: Pr(Bp|p) 
Negative reliability: Pr(~Bp|~p) 
Note that these two kinds of reliability can come apart: someone can have a high positive 
reliability but a low negative reliability, and vice versa. For example, a highly credulous agent 
who is willing to believe virtually anything has a high positive reliability, but a low negative 
reliability. Conversely, a highly incredulous agent who is willing to believe virtually nothing 
has a low positive reliability, but a high negative reliability. 
The fact that an agent’s positive and negative reliabilities can come apart raises the 
question of what it means for two agents to have the same overall reliability. A simple proposal 
would be to understand epistemic peerhood as a matter of having the same positive reliability 
and the same negative reliability. However, this would seem like an overly restrictive 
requirement. Suppose, for example, that an agent A has a higher positive reliability than an 
agent B, whereas agent B has a higher negative reliability than agent A. In at least some such 
cases, it seems reasonable to count A and B as epistemic peers. To allow for such cases, we will 
instead try to combine an agent’s positive and negative reliabilities into a single measure. A 
familiar way of doing so is given by the likelihood ratio (see, e.g., Goldman 2001): 
Likelihood Ratio: Pr(Bp|p)1 − Pr(~Bp|~p) 
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Intuitively, the likelihood ratio indicates how likely an agent is to believe that p when p is true 
as compared to how likely the agent is to believe that p when p is false. Accordingly, the 
likelihood ratio is positively dependent on both an agent’s positive and negative reliability: any 
increase in an agent’s positive or negative reliability will result in an increase in the agent’s 
likelihood ratio. 
However, there is reason not to rest content with the likelihood ratio as a measure of an 
agent’s overall reliability. Although the likelihood ratio is positively dependent on both an 
agent’s positive and negative reliability, it nevertheless depends in very different ways on 
them: while the likelihood ratio is a linear function of the agent’s positive reliability, it is a 
positively accelerating power function of the agent’s negative reliability (as illustrated in 
Figure 1). Intuitively, what this means is that the likelihood ratio tends to give different weight 
to an agent’s positive and negative reliabilities. For example, an agent with a positive reliability 
of 60 % and a negative reliability of 30 % has a likelihood ratio of .6/(1 - .3) = .86, whereas an 
agent with a positive reliability of 30 % and a negative reliability of 60 % has a likelihood ratio 
of only .3/(1 - .6) = .75. In this case, the likelihood ratio gives more weight to the agent’s 
positive reliability than to her negative reliability. In other cases, the opposite is the case. For 
example, an agent with a positive reliability of 50 % and a negative reliability of 80 % has a 
likelihood ratio of .5/(1 - .8) = 2.5, whereas an agent with a positive reliability of 80 % and a 
negative reliability of 50 % has a likelihood ratio of only .8/(1 - .5) = 1.6. Here the likelihood 
ratio gives more weight to the agent’s negative reliability than to her positive reliability.7 
           
                                                      
7 More generally, if A has positive reliability x and negative reliability y, and B has positive reliability y and 
negative reliability x, it is easily verified that A and B have the same likelihood ratio iff x = y or x + y = 1.  
 8 
                  
Figure 1: The straight line represents the likelihood ratio as a function of an agent’s positive reliability (setting the 
agent’s negative reliability to 30 % as an illustration). The curved line represents the likelihood ratio as a function 
of an agent’s negative reliability (setting the agent’s positive reliability to 30 % as an illustration). 
For present purposes, we find this behavior of the likelihood ratio problematic for a few 
different reasons. First, it is not clear that an agent’s positive and negative reliability should 
ever be given different weight in determining the agent’s overall reliability. From a purely 
epistemic point of view, it is far from clear that it is more important to believe what is true 
than to avoid believing what is false, or vice versa. Of course, there are those who argue that 
certain non-epistemic features of an agent’s situation may influence the relative value of 
having true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs (see, e.g., Levi 1962 and Riggs 2008). To the 
extent that this sort of view is correct, certain pragmatic features of an agent’s situation might 
play a role in determining how an agent’s positive and negative reliabilities should be weighed 
against each other. But in any case, those who want to give different weight to an agent’s 
positive and negative reliabilities will presumably prefer a reliability measure that, unlike the 
likelihood ratio, allows us to vary the weighting in a flexible manner, depending on relevant 
features of an agent’s situation. 
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We shall therefore replace the likelihood ratio with a weighted average of an agent’s 
positive and negative reliabilities (where w+ and w- are the weights of the agent’s positive and 
negative reliabilities respectively): 
Reliability (weighted average): w+∙Pr(Bp|p) + w-∙Pr(~Bp|~p)
w+ + w-  
This reliability measure is also positively dependent on both an agent’s positive and negative 
reliability: any increase in an agent’s positive or negative reliability will result in an increase 
in the weighted average (as long as the weights are positive). Since an agent’s positive and 
negative reliabilities both lie in the interval [0,1], the weighted average of those reliabilities 
also lies in the interval [0,1]. A reliability of 100 % corresponds to always believing that p when 
p is true, and never believing that p when p is false. Conversely, a reliability of 0 % corresponds 
to never believing that p when p is true, and always believing that p when p is false. In between 
these extremes, we find a spectrum of intermediate levels of reliability that can be reached by 
different combinations of positive and negative reliabilities. For instance, if we assume that 
w+ = w-, an agent with a positive reliability of 80 % and a negative reliability of 30 % will have 
the same overall reliability as an agent with a positive reliability of 60 % and a negative 
reliability of 50 %. 
To keep matters relatively simple, we shall henceforth assume that w+ = w-, which means 
that the weighted average boils down to a simple linear average: 
Reliability (linear average): 
Pr(Bp|p) + Pr(~Bp|~p)
2  
We will use this linear average to represent the overall reliability of individual agents as well 
as group agents. In doing so, we do not want to suggest that the linear average of an agent’s 
positive and negative reliabilities maps onto any substantive fact about an agent’s ‘true 
reliability’. The proposed reliability measure is simply meant as one reasonable way of filling 
in the details of a reliabilist conception of epistemic peerhood.8 
                                                      
8 We shall sidestep potential issues concerning how the our notion of reliability relates to the question of what 
makes groups beliefs justified. In a recent paper, Lackey (2016, §8) has presented an argument, which purports 
to show that the kind of reliability that can be achieved at the group level as a result of a group’s BAF and reliability 
profile cannot plausibly be regarded as what matters to whether the group’s belief state is epistemically justified 
or not. A detailed discussion of Lackey’s argument is beyond the scope of this paper. But even if a group’s 
reliability is not what ultimately determines the justificatory status of the group’s beliefs, it seems that a group’s 
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Given this reliability measure, how do we determine the reliability of a group with a given 
BAF and given distribution of individual reliabilities among its members? Following List 
(2005), we will make the simplifying assumptions that the group members form their beliefs 
independently of each other, and that each group member’s positive reliability is identical to 
her negative reliability.9 These assumptions make it easier to determine a group’s reliability 
as a function of the group’s BAF and reliability profile. For example, if a group G uses majority 
voting and has an odd number n of members with a reliability of r, we can determine G’s 
reliability rG as follows: 
rG = �  n!i!(n− i)! ri(1 − r)n−in
i=n+12                                                                       (Majority voting) 
By comparison, if G uses unanimity voting or dictatorship instead of majority voting, its 
reliability is instead given by: 
rG = 
rn + 1− (1 − r)n
2                                                                                     (Unanimity voting) 
rG = r                                                                                                                             (Dictatorship) 
The complexity in determining a group’s reliability obviously depends on the complexity of 
the group’s BAF and reliability profile. But as long as the group’s BAF and reliability profile 
are known, it should be possible to determine the group’s reliability. 
                                                      
reliability could (a presumably would) still be epistemically relevant and, in particular, relevant for how groups 
should revise their belief in light of group peer disagreement. 
9 Note that even though each group member’s positive reliability is identical to her negative reliability, the group 
might nevertheless have different positive and negative reliabilities. 
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Figure 2: The graph shows how, relative to different BAFs, the reliability of a group with n equally reliable members 
depends on the members’ shared reliability r (setting n = 9 as an illustration). 
It is worth pausing at this point to compare how well the three BAFs above serve to 
optimize G’s reliability. As illustrated in Figure 2, G’s reliability is greater under majority 
voting than under both unanimity voting and dictatorship given that G’s members are more 
than 50 % reliable. By contrast, unanimity voting outperforms both dictatorship and majority 
voting given that the members are less than 50 % reliable. This already shows that the same 
BAF may perform very differently in different groups, depending on the reliability profiles of 
the groups. Later, in §3, we will say more about how to determine the optimal BAF for a given 
group, but for now it suffices to note that there is no “one size fits all” answer to the question 
of which BAF maximizes a group’s reliability. Which BAF is optimal for a given group 
depends on the specifics of the reliability profile of that group.10 
We are now ready to fill in the details of our reliabilist notion of peerhood: two agents A 
and B are epistemic peers with respect to a proposition p just in case A and B are equally 
reliable with respect to p (that is, just in case the average of A’s positive and negative 
                                                      
10 See also List (2005) who compares different BAFs as they perform with respect to a group’s positive and 
negative reliabilities when taken separately. 
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reliabilities with respect to p is identical to the average of B’s positive and negative reliabilities 
with respect to p). We will apply this account of epistemic peerhood to individuals as well as 
groups.  
Given this account of peerhood, one might wonder whether the peerhood status of two 
groups depends in any systematic way on the peerhood status among individual members of 
the two groups. In particular, it might seem natural to think that two groups cannot be peers 
unless at least some of their members are peers. However, on the present picture, it turns out 
that member peerhood is neither necessary nor sufficient for group peerhood. A simple 
illustration is given in Table 2. The groups G1 and G2 are peers, although none of their 
members are peers. Conversely, the groups G1 and G3 are not peers, although all of their 
members are peers. Both results flow from the fact that a group’s reliability is not only a 
function of the reliabilities of its members, but also of the group’s BAF. 
G1: Majority voting  G2: Dictatorship  G3: Unanimity voting 
 r   r   r 
Member 1 75 %  Dictator 84 %  Member 1 75 % 
Member 2 75 %  Member 2 50 %  Member 2 75 % 
Member 3 75 %  Member 3 50 %  Member 3 75 % 
Group 84 %  Group 84 %  Group 70 % 
Table 2: The groups G1 and G2 are peers, although none of their members are peers. Conversely, the groups G1 and 
G3 are not peers, although all of their members are peers. 
In light of these preliminary remarks on group disagreement and group peerhood, we 
are now in a position to formulate the kind of generic case of group peer disagreement that 
will be our focus in the remainder of the paper: 
Group Peer Disagreement: Let G1 and G2 be two groups such that: 
(a) G1 and G2 are epistemic peers with respect to a proposition p; and 
(b) G1 and G2 disagree about p. 
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The question we are interested in is how, if at all, G1 and G2 should revise their beliefs about p 
in light of their mutual disagreement. To simplify our discussion, we will assume that neither 
group initially suspends judgment about p. Moreover, we will assume that both groups (or 
whoever makes the revision decision on behalf of the groups) possess the following three 
pieces of information about each group: (i) the group’s BAF, (ii) the group’s belief profile 
(that is, each group member’s belief about p), and (iii) the group’s reliability profile (that is, 
each group member’s reliability with respect to p). In §4, we will discuss how one might relax 
this last assumption to accommodate cases where the groups have less information about each 
other. But initially, we will focus on the idealized case. 
3. The Group Equal Weight View 
As announced in the introduction, we will assume that a theory of group peer disagreement 
should satisfy a principle along the following lines: 
Equal Weight Dictum: The parties to a peer disagreement should place equal weight on 
each other’s opinions. 
This dictum, while intuitive, is obviously quite vague: what, exactly, does it mean to place 
‘equal weight’ on two opinions? There already exist a number of proposals for how to place 
equal weight on individual beliefs. Perhaps the best-known proposal is the ‘split the 
difference’ view, according to which the parties to an individual peer disagreement should 
adopt their average credence in the disputed proposition. In a binary framework, this 
amounts to saying that the disagreeing parties should suspend judgment about the disputed 
proposition (assuming, as we do, that neither party initially suspends judgment about the 
disputed proposition).11 
The question we are interested in here is, of course, what it means to place equal weight 
on two group beliefs. Since we think of group beliefs as binary (rather than graded) attitudes, 
an initially plausible interpretation of the Equal Weight Dictum for groups would be: 
                                                      
11 In previous work, we have defended an alternative to the ‘split the difference’ interpretation of the Equal 
Weight Dictum for individuals (Rasmussen et al. 2017). See also Fitelson and Jehle (2009) for a discussion of 
different interpretations of the Equal Weight Dictum in the case of individual peer disagreement. 
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Uniform Conciliation: In cases of group peer disagreement, both groups should suspend 
judgment about the disputed proposition. 
This view is prima facie plausible, because any other attitude than suspension of judgment 
would seem to place extra weight on one of the groups’ initial beliefs. If so, Uniform 
Conciliation is the only possible view that does not violate the Equal Weight Dictum. 
Despite its initial appeal, however, Uniform Conciliation cannot ultimately be the right 
interpretation of the Equal Weight Dictum for groups. To see why, consider the following 
case: 
Different Majority Sizes: Two groups G1 and G2 each have a hundred members with 
individual reliabilities of 55 %. Both groups use majority voting. All of G1’s members 
believe p, which means that G1 believes p. Only 49 of G2’s members believe p, which 
means that G2 believes ~p. 
Since G1 and G2 use the same BAF and have the exact same reliability profile, they have the 
same group reliability, and hence face a mutual peer disagreement. So, according to Uniform 
Conciliation, the groups should suspend judgment about p in light of the disagreement. Yet, 
this seems like the wrong advice. After all, there is a clear majority in favor of p in the 
combined group (149 out of a total of 200 members in the combined group believe p, while 
only 51 members believe ~p). Given that both groups know this, it seems unreasonable to 
suspend judgment about p rather than to believe that p. 
We can motivate this verdict a little further by comparing the probability of p given G1’s 
belief profile with the probability of ~p given G2’s belief profile. Since G1’s majority in favor 
of p is very large (indeed, as large as it can possibly be), the probability of p given G1’s vote is 
very close to 1 (more precisely, 99.9 %). By contrast, since G2’s majority in favor of ~p is very 
small (indeed, as small as it can possibly be), the probability of p given G2’s vote is not very 
close to 0 (more precisely, 40.1 %). So, while G1’s belief profile speaks very strongly in favor 
of p, G2’s belief profile only speaks weakly in favor of ~p. The reason, then, why Uniform 
Conciliation delivers the wrong verdict in Different Majority Sizes is that it fails to take into 
account the fact that G1’s majority in favor of p is larger than G2’s majority in favor of ~p. 
Someone might object that the asymmetry between the probability of p given G1’s belief 
profile and the probability of ~p given G2’s belief profile shows that G1 and G2 were not peers 
to begin with. After all, how can the groups be peers if G1’s belief profile has a significantly 
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greater impact on the probability of p than does G2’s belief profile? We think this worry rests 
on a mistaken way of thinking about peerhood, but we shall defer a detailed discussion of this 
worry to §4. For now, we proceed on the assumption that cases like Different Majority Sizes 
indeed count as cases of group peer disagreement. 
Consider, next, the following alternative to Uniform Conciliation: 
BAF-Dependent Conciliation: In cases of group peer disagreement, each group should 
use its own BAF on all members in the combined group. 
Contrary to Uniform Conciliation, this view delivers the right verdict in Different Majority 
Sizes. According to BAF-Dependent Conciliation, G1 and G2 should both use majority voting 
on the beliefs of all 200 members in the combined group, and since the majority of members 
in the combined group believe p, the groups should end up believing p. However, BAF-
Dependent Conciliation runs into a different problem. Consider the following case: 
Different Reliability Profiles: Two groups G1 and G2 each have a hundred members. G1 
uses majority voting, and all of G1’s members have individual reliabilities of 60 %. Only 
49 of G1’s members believe p, which means that G1 believes ~p. G2 uses dictatorship, and 
G2’s dictator has a reliability of 97 %. The rest of G2’s members have individual 
reliabilities of 50 %. G2’s dictator believes p, which means that G2 believes p. The rest of 
G2’s members believe ~p. 
Since G1 uses majority voting and has a uniform reliability profile, we can use the equation 
from §2 to show that G1 has a group reliability of 97 %. Thus, since G2’s reliability is identical 
that of its dictator, the groups face a mutual peer disagreement. According to BAF-Dependent 
Conciliation, G1 should retain its belief that ~p upon disagreement, since there is a majority 
in the combined group in favor of ~p (150 out of a total of 200 members in the combined 
group believe ~p, while only 50 members believe p). Yet, this seems like the wrong 
recommendation. After all, p is considerably more probable than ~p given all 200 beliefs in 
the combined group, since G2’s highly reliable dictator believes that p while G1’s majority in 
favor of ~p is extremely small. Given that G1 knows this, it seems unreasonable to retain its 
belief in ~p. 
The reason why BAF-Dependent Conciliation delivers the wrong verdict in Different 
Reliability Profiles is that G1’s own BAF (i.e. majority voting) is ill-suited for the combined 
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group—it does not do a good job in maximize the reliability of the combined group. This is 
because majority voting gives equal weight to all members regardless of their reliability they 
are. Yet, from a purely epistemic point of view, the members in the combined group should 
not be given equal weight, since they have very different reliabilities. In particular, G2’s highly 
reliable dictator should be given much more weight than the rest of the members in the 
combined group.  
This diagnosis leads to our final proposal: 
Group Equal Weight View (GEW): In cases of group peer disagreement, each group 
should use the optimal BAF for the combined group on the combined group. 
The key difference between GEW and BAF-Dependent Conciliation is that GEW advises the 
groups to use the optimal BAF for the combined group (i.e. the BAF that maximizes the 
combined group’s reliability) rather than their initial BAFs. What motivates this 
requirement? Part of the motivation stems from the fact that the optimal BAF for the 
combined group seems like the only non-ad hoc alternative to the groups’ initial BAFs. If the 
groups are to adopt new BAFs upon disagreement, it would seem arbitrary, if not 
unreasonable, to advise them to adopt a BAF that is not somehow well-suited for the 
combined group. Another part of the motivation stems from GEW’s ability to handle cases 
like Different Majority Sizes and Different Reliability Profiles. However, before we can derive 
such verdicts from GEW, we need to know how to determine the optimal BAF for a given 
group.  
Generally speaking, there are two features of a BAF that one might modify in order to 
maximize a group’s reliability. First, there is what we will call the BAF’s weight profile: 
roughly, a specification of how much weight is being placed on the beliefs of different group 
members in determining the degree to which the members collectively endorse a given 
proposition. For example, majority voting and unanimity voting both give equal weight to all 
members. By contrast, dictatorship gives no weight to all but a single member. To get more 
precise on the notion of a weight profile, let G be a group with n members, let ri be the ith 
member’s reliability with respect to a proposition p, let bi be the ith member’s belief about p 
(where bi = 1 if the ith member believes p, and bi = 0 if the ith member disbelieves p), and let 
wi be the weight assigned by G’s BAF to bi. The degree cG to which the members of G 
collectively endorse p is then given by: 
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Collective Endorsement:  cG = ∑ wi⋅bini=1∑ wini=1  
Since the value of bi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is either 0 or 1, the value of cG lies in the closed interval [0, 
1]. If cG = 1, G’s members collectively endorse p to the highest possible degree: every member 
with a non-zero weight believes that p. Conversely, if cG = 0, G’s members collectively endorse 
p to the lowest possible degree: every member with a non-zero weight disbelieves p. 
The second feature of a BAF that one might modify is what we will call the BAF’s belief 
threshold, that is, a number between 0 and 1 representing the degree to which the members of 
G must collectively endorse p in order for G to form a belief that p. More precisely, if G’s BAF 
has a belief threshold of t, and G’s members collectively endorse p to degree cG, then G believes 
p just in case cG > t. To illustrate the idea, suppose G uses majority voting and that two out of 
G’s three members believe p (b1 = b2 = 1 and b3 = 0). Since majority voting places equal weight 
on all members, we get the following weight profile: w1 = w2 = w3. Using this weight profile to 
determine the degree cG to which G’s members collectively endorse p, we get: cG = .66. Thus, 
since majority voting has a belief threshold of t = .5, G believes that p. By comparison, if G 
had used unanimity voting instead of majority voting, G would not have believed p, since 
unanimity voting has a belief threshold of t = 1. 
The question, then, is how we find a combination of a belief threshold t and a weight 
profile <w1, … ,wn> that maximizes G’s reliability rG given that G has a reliability profile of 
<r1, … , rn>. The answer obviously depends on how we define ‘reliability’, but if we stick to 
the linear average of an agent’s positive and negative reliability, the task becomes that of 
maximizing the following quantity:  
2rG  = Pr(Bp|p) + Pr(~Bp|~p) = Pr(cG > t|p) + Pr(cG ≤ t|~p) = Pr �∑ wi⋅bini=1∑ wini=1  > t � p� + Pr �∑ wi⋅bini=1∑ wini=1 ≤ t � ~p�. 
As Nitzan and Paroush (1982) first showed, and Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) later 
generalized, this optimization problem is solved by a weighted majority rule with a belief 
threshold of t = .5 and a weight profile that satisfies the following relationship:12 
                                                      
12 See also Pettigrew (ms.) for a related discussion of how best to aggregate the credences of different, and 
potentially disagreeing, experts on some matter. 
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wi ∝ log � ri1− ri�. 
This dependency ensures that agents with a reliability of less than 50 % are given negative 
weight, whereas agents with a reliability greater than 50 % are given positive weight. Agents 
with a reliability of precisely 50 % are given no weight at all. Moreover, an agent’s weight 
approaches infinity, when the agent’s reliability approaches 100 %. Conversely, an agent’s 











Figure 3: The graph shows how an agent’s weight w depends on the agent’s reliability r given that w is proportional 
to the logarithmic likelihood ratio log(r/(1-r)). 
We can now determine the optimal BAFs for the combined groups in Different Majority 
Sizes and Different Reliability Profiles. In both cases, the optimal BAF has a belief threshold 
of t = .5, but the weight profile of the optimal BAF is not the same in both cases (see Table 3). 
In Different Majority Sizes, the optimal BAF has a uniform weight profile, which is 
unsurprising since the reliability profile in the combined group is uniform. As such, the 
optimal BAF for the combined group in Different Majority Sizes amounts to simple majority 
                                                      
13 Different procedural considerations might, of course, speak against using the epistemically optimal BAF. For 
example, considerations of fairness might speak against giving uneven weight to members of the electorate in a 
democracy (see, e.g., List and Goodin 2001). But since our focus here is purely epistemic, we will not enter into 
a discussion of how to weigh epistemic and procedural considerations against each other. 
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voting. In Different Reliability Profiles, the optimal BAF has a non-uniform weight profile, 
which is also unsurprising since the reliability profile in the combined group is non-uniform. 
More precisely, G2’s highly reliable dictator is given 8.6 times more weight than each of G1’s 
members, and the remaining 49 members in G2 (all of whom have a reliability of 50 %) are 
given no weight at all. 
 Reliability profile Weight profile of optimal BAF 
Different Majority 
Sizes 
r1 = ⋯ = r200 = .55 w1 = ⋯ = w200 = 1 
Different Reliability 
Profiles 
r1 = ⋯ = r99 = .50 
r100 = ⋯ = r199 = .6 
r200 = .97 
w1 = ⋯ = w99 = 0 
w100 = ⋯ = w199 = 1 
w200 = 8.6 
Table 3: In Different Majority Sizes, the optimal BAF has a uniform weight profile, because the reliability profile 
of the combined group is uniform. By contrast, in Different Reliability Profiles, the optimal BAF has non-uniform 
weight profile, because the reliability profile of the combined group is non-uniform. 
It is worth noting that there is not in general a unique optimal BAF for any given group. 
Typically there will be a whole set of optimal BAFs, all of which yield the same group 
reliability. For instance, in Different Reliability Profiles, we can change the value of w200 from 
8.6 to any other value in the open interval ]8,10[ without thereby changing the reliability of 
the combined group. The reason for this is that the reliability of the combined group is a step-
function of w200 (as illustrated in Figure 4).14 Consequently, the BAF described in Table 3 is 
just one of a range of optimal BAFs, and GEW does not discriminate among equally well-
suited BAFs. 
                                                      
14 More precisely, the reliability rG of the combined group in Different Reliability Profiles depends on the weight 
w200 of the dictator in G2 in the following way: 
rG = .97⋅ �  100!i!(100− i)! ⋅.6i⋅(1− .6)100−i100




Now that we have determined the (or rather an) optimal BAF for the combined groups 
in Different Majority Sizes and Different Reliability Profiles, we need to calculate the degree 








= ∑ bi + 8.6⋅b100199i=100100 + 8.6 = .53                          (Different Reliability Profiles) 
In both cases, the members of the combined group collectively endorse p to a higher degree 
than the relevant belief threshold of t = .5, which means that GEW advises both pairs of groups 
to believe that p upon disagreement. Thus, unlike Uniform Conciliation and BAF-Dependent 
Conciliation, GEW delivers the intuitively right verdicts in Different Majority Sizes and 













Figure 4: In Different Reliability Profiles, the reliability rG of the combined group is a step-function of w200 with a 
maximum on the open interval ]8,10[. 
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This completes our initial presentation and motivation of our favored view of group peer 
disagreement. Obviously, we have only tested the view against a limited range of cases, and 
further refinements may prove necessary. Indeed, one might even doubt that any single theory 
of group peer disagreement can accommodate all cases without exception.15 But at the very 
least, we hope to have said enough to make it worthwhile scrutinizing GEW in further detail. 
In the following section, we examine seven potential worries about GEW that have come to 
our attention. Defending GEW against these worries will also give us the opportunity to 
highlight and clarify various notable features and implications of the view. 
4. Objections to GEW 
4.1 First objection: GEW violates the Equal Weight Dictum 
The first worry we want to examine concerns the fact that GEW sometimes advises only one 
of the disagreeing peer groups to revise its belief. We have already seen two such examples, 
viz. Different Majority Sizes and Different Reliability Profiles. Yet, doesn’t GEW thereby 
imply, contrary to the Equal Weight Dictum, that disagreeing peer groups should sometimes 
not place equal weight on each other’s opinions? The answer depends on what we understand 
by ‘equal weight’. On one understanding, GEW does indeed violate the Equal Weight Dictum 
in virtue of saying that disagreeing peer groups should sometimes revise their beliefs in a non-
uniform manner. This interpretation of the Equal Weight Dictum is what gave Uniform 
Conciliation its initial appeal. However, as we saw in §3, Uniform Conciliation runs into 
problems, because it fails to take into account epistemically relevant details about the belief 
profiles of the disagreeing groups. As such, we take it to be a strength of GEW that it violates 
the Equal Weight Dictum interpreted this way. 
On another understanding, GEW satisfies the Equal Weight Dictum in virtue of saying 
that disagreeing peer groups should always use the optimal BAF for the combined group on 
all members of both groups alike. This is the sense in which GEW should be understood as an 
equal weight view of group peer disagreement. And, as we have seen, this interpretation of the 
Equal Weight Dictum makes room for cases of non-uniform belief revision such as Different 
Majority Sizes and Different Reliability Distributions. Obviously, it also makes room for cases 
of uniform belief revision. Suppose, for example, that the groups in Different Majority Sizes 
                                                      
15 See Heesen and van der Kolk (2016) for considerations in this direction. 
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had identical belief profiles, or that the groups in Different Reliability Profiles had identical 
reliability profiles. So, in general, the question of whether disagreeing peer groups should 
revise their beliefs in a uniform manner or not depends on specific details of the groups’ belief 
profiles and reliability profiles. The only recommendation that GEW always gives is that at 
least one of the disagreeing peer groups should revise its belief. The obvious reason is that 
disagreeing peer groups who comply with GEW will always end up agreeing in virtue of 
applying the same BAF (viz. the optimal BAF for the combined group) to the same set of belief 
states (viz. the total set of belief states of the members in the combined group). So, given that 
the groups initially disagreed, at least one of the groups will have to revise its belief in light of 
the disagreement. 
4.2 Second objection: GEW conflicts with the equal weight view of individual peer 
disagreement 
A related worry concerns how GEW relates to the equal weight view of individual peer 
disagreement. On every reasonable interpretation of the Equal Weight Dictum, the parties to 
an individual peer disagreement should always revise their beliefs in a uniform manner. Yet, 
as we have seen, GEW implies that the parties to a group peer disagreement should not always 
revise their beliefs in a uniform manner. This raises the worry that GEW is somehow in 
conflict with the equal weight view of individual peer disagreement. 
On closer inspection, however, GEW turns out to be fully consistent with the equal 
weight view of individual peer disagreement. To see why, consider how GEW handles cases 
of group peer disagreement between groups with only a single member. Let G1 and G2 be two 
single-member groups and let m1 and m2 be their single members, where Gi’s belief about p is 
simply given by mi’s belief about p. Assuming that m1 and m2 are peers and that they disagree 
about p, G1 and G2 face a mutual group peer disagreement. Moreover, GEW trivially implies 
that G1 and G2 should suspend judgment about p upon disagreement. So, according to GEW, 
disagreeing single-member peer groups should always suspend judgment about the disputed 
proposition. We take this result to be in line with the equal weight view of individual peer 
disagreement. 
4.3 Third objection: GEW is based on the wrong notion of peerhood 
Previously, in §3, we anticipated the worry that GEW is based on a flawed notion of peerhood, 
because it allows for cases like Different Majority Sizes, in which two groups G1 and G2 are 
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peers, although the probability of p given G1’s belief profile differs considerably from the 
probability of ~p given G2’s belief profile. Why not instead say that two groups G1 and G2 are 
epistemic peers with respect to a proposition p just in case the absolute difference between .5 
and the probability of p given G1’s belief profile is identical to the absolute difference between 
.5 and the probability of p given G2’s belief profile? This would prevent cases like Different 
Majority Sizes from counting as cases of group peer disagreement, and hence restore Uniform 
Conciliation as a viable interpretation of GEW. 
While we doubt that there is a uniquely correct notion of peerhood out there to be 
discovered, we can think of at least four reasons to prefer our reliabilist conception of 
peerhood to the ‘probabilist’ conception of peerhood suggested above. First, our reliabilist 
conception of peerhood reflects the way in which epistemic performance is typically 
measured in the belief aggregation literature (see, e.g., List 2005). As such, our reliabilist 
conception of peerhood makes it easy to see how GEW related to the rest of the belief 
aggregation literature. 
Second, the probabilist conception of peerhood has the implication that whether two 
groups are peers with respect to a proposition p can be determined only after the group 
members have given their votes about p. This deviates considerably from existing evidentialist 
and reliabilist notions of peerhood, all of which allow peerhood relations to be established 
independently of the disagreement at hand. So, here is another respect in which we take our 
reliabilist conception of peerhood to be in better alignment with existing conceptions of 
peerhood. 
Third, the probabilist conception of peerhood implies that a strictly fewer number of 
pairs of groups will count as epistemic peers, since all groups who are peers in the probabilist 
sense will also be peers in our reliabilist sense, but not vice versa. Consequently, a theory of 
group peer disagreement based on the probabilist conception of peerhood will apply to a 
strictly narrower range of cases than does GEW. So, also for reasons of generality, we find our 
reliabilist conception of peerhood preferable to the probabilist alternative. 
Finally, we would like to point out that someone who prefers a probabilist conception of 
peerhood remains free to accept GEW as it applies to those cases in which the groups are peers 
in the probabilist sense. Plausibly, in such cases, the disagreeing groups should suspend 
judgment about the disputed proposition, since their beliefs speak equally strongly for and 
against the disputed proposition. GEW seems to deliver precisely this result. For example, the 
groups in Same Majority Size and Same Reliability Profiles are peers in the probabilist sense, 
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and, as shown in §4.1, GEW advises both of these pairs of groups to suspend judgment about 
the disputed proposition. 
4.4 Fourth objection: GEW renders group disagreement and group peerhood epistemically 
irrelevant 
A notable property of GEW is that its verdicts about how the parties to a group peer 
disagreement should revise their beliefs depend solely on the groups’ reliability profiles and 
belief profiles: the groups’ reliability profiles determine which BAF is optimal for the 
combined group, and their belief profiles determine which set of individual belief states the 
optimal BAF should be used to aggregate. Furthermore, as we saw in §2, there is no 
straightforward connection between how two groups’ reliability profiles and belief profiles 
compare, and whether those groups are peers and/or disagree. As a result, GEW implies that 
the fact that two groups are peers and disagree is not directly relevant for how the groups 
should revise their beliefs. What is directly relevant, according to GEW, is the beliefs and 
reliabilities of the group members. 
This might strike someone as a puzzling result. How can GEW be a satisfying view of 
group peer disagreement, if its verdicts are not somehow influenced by the fact that the groups 
in question are peers and that they disagree? In response to this worry, we want to maintain 
that there are good reasons to think that a theory of group peer disagreement in fact should 
render disagreement and peerhood epistemically irrelevant. As we have seen, a group peer 
disagreement need not be the result of a difference of opinion among equally reliable group 
members, since different BAFs may yield different group beliefs and different group 
reliabilities given the same belief profile and reliability profile (and, conversely, different BAFs 
may yield the same group beliefs and same group reliabilities given different belief profiles 
and reliability profiles). So, the fact that two groups are peers and disagree may simply be a 
product of an epistemically irrelevant factor, namely the BAFs initially used by the groups.  
We may further illustrate this point by considering a variation of Different Reliability 
Profiles: 
Non-Peer Agreement: Two groups G1 and G2 each have a hundred members. G1 uses 
dictatorship, and G1’s dictator has a reliability of 60 %. The rest of G1’s members also 
have a reliability of 60 %. 51 of G1’s members believe p, including G1’s dictator, which 
means that G1 believes p. G2 uses majority voting, and G2’s dictator has a reliability of 97 
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%. The rest of G2’s members have a reliability of 50 %. G2’s dictator believes p, which 
means that G2 believes p. The rest of G2’s members believe ~p. 
Here G1 and G2 are neither peers, nor do they disagree: G2 is obviously more reliable than G1, 
and both groups believe that p. Yet, since the groups have the exact same belief profiles and 
reliability profiles as the groups in Different Reliability Profiles, GEW advises both pairs of 
groups to believe p upon learning about each other’s opinions. Moreover, we take this to be 
the correct advice given that it is irrelevant, from a purely epistemic point of view, that the 
groups in Non-Peer Agreement initially used different BAFs than those initially used by the 
groups in Different Reliability Profiles. What is epistemically relevant is which BAF is optimal 
for the combined group, and this is the same in both cases. As such, we consider it a strength 
and not a weakness of GEW that its verdicts are not directly influenced by the fact that two 
groups are peers and disagree. 
It is worth noting that matters are importantly different in the case of individual peer 
disagreement. An individual peer disagreement is always the result of a difference of opinion 
among equally reliable individuals, which means that the fact that two individuals are peers 
and that they disagree is always the product of epistemically relevant factors, namely the 
individuals’ initial beliefs and reliabilities. So, the fact that two individuals are peers and that 
they disagree is always directly relevant for how they should revise their beliefs. This marks a 
central difference between individual peer disagreement and group peer disagreement, which 
is due to the role that BAFs play in the formation of group beliefs. 
Still, one might wonder why we present GEW as a theory of group peer disagreement, if 
the view applies to a wider range of cases in which the groups are not peers and/or do not 
disagree. Why not instead understand GEW as a general theory of how groups should revise 
their beliefs upon learning the beliefs of other groups? We want to offer two comments in 
reply to this sort of suggestion. First, we take it to be a strength of GEW if the view turns out 
to apply beyond cases of group peer disagreement. However, our aim has not been to develop 
a fully general theory of how group should revise their beliefs upon learning the beliefs of 
other groups. So, to avoid premature generalizations, we do not want to say that groups 
should always comply with GEW when learning about the beliefs of other groups. Second, if 
we are right in claiming that a theory of group peer disagreement should render disagreement 
and peerhood epistemically irrelevant, we should expect a theory of group peer disagreement 
to also apply to cases like Non-Peer Agreement. The fact that GEW applies beyond cases of 
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group peer disagreement is not an artefact of the view, but a consequence of the role that BAFs 
play in determining whether two groups are peers and whether they disagree. Those who find 
this consequence undesirable might take it as a reason to reject the aggregation model of 
group belief. But this would still leave intact the claim that if the aggregation model of group 
belief is correct, then a theory of group peer disagreement should render peerhood and 
disagreement epistemically irrelevant; and we take this conditional claim to be important and 
interesting in its own right. 
A final worry concerning the fact that GEW renders group peerhood and group 
disagreement epistemically irrelevant goes as follows: if GEW effectively implies that the 
parties to a group peer disagreement should simply ignore the group peer disagreement itself, 
and instead look at the individual beliefs and reliabilities of the group members, doesn’t this 
undermine the interest in the question we have set out to explore in this paper?16 We want to 
address this worry by offering three reasons to think that the present project remains 
important and interesting despite the fact that GEW renders group peerhood and group 
disagreement epistemically irrelevant. First, as already mentioned in the introduction, group 
disagreement is a relatively new and underexplored topic. As such, we take it to be an open 
question whether there is a distinct problem of group disagreement over and above the 
problem of individual disagreement. If it turns out that the problem of group disagreement 
can be solved by looking solely at the level of the group members’ beliefs and reliabilities, this 
would itself be an interesting result. For the reasons given below, we do not in fact think that 
GEW implies anything this strong. But in any case, part of the interest of our investigation 
derives from the light it may shed on the question of whether there is a distinct problem of 
group peer disagreement in the first place. 
Second, although GEW implies that two parties G1 and G2 to a group peer disagreement 
should revise their beliefs in a way that depends solely on the beliefs and reliabilities of the 
group members, it does not thereby render it irrelevant that G1 and G2 are groups rather than 
mere collections of individuals. For one thing, the fact that G1 and G2 are groups means that 
they are to aggregate the beliefs of their group members in the first place. Had G1 and G2 been 
mere collections of individuals, there would be no question as to what the groups should 
believe at any point. Hence, there is a trivial sense in which it is relevant that G1 and G2 are 
groups. Less trivially, the fact that G1 and G2 are groups is what gives rise to one of the central 
                                                      
16 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this worry to our attention. 
 27 
differences between GEW and the equal weight view of individual peer disagreement, namely 
that GEW sometimes recommends only one of the parties to a group peer disagreement to 
revise its initial group belief. As explained in §3 and §4.1, this result flows from the fact that 
group beliefs are the outputs of BAFs, whereas individual beliefs are not. So, here is another 
sense in which there is a role to play, on our view, for the fact that G1 and G2 are groups rather 
than mere collections of individuals. 
Finally, although there is a sense in which GEW renders group peerhood and group 
disagreement epistemically irrelevant, GEW nevertheless amounts to a substantive view of 
group peer disagreement that offers non-trivial advice about how the parties to a group peer 
disagreement should resolve the disagreement. The fact that GEW’s advice is a function solely 
of the group members’ beliefs and reliabilities does not mean that GEW fails to be a view of 
group peer disagreement, nor does it mean that group peer disagreement is not a genuine 
phenomenon worth our interest. All it means is that what ultimately matters, from an 
epistemic point of view, is the beliefs and reliabilities of the group members; not those of the 
groups. 
4.5 Fifth objection: GEW is inconsistent with the aggregation model of group belief 
The fifth worry we want to examine concerns how GEW relates to the aggregation model of 
group belief. The way we have introduced the aggregation framework, a group’s belief state is 
represented as the output of a BAF whose input consists solely of the set of belief states of the 
group’s members. Yet, if two disagreeing peer groups comply with GEW, they will end up 
with belief states that are not the result of applying a BAF solely to the belief states of their own 
members. Rather, they will end up with belief states that are the result of applying a BAF to 
the belief states of their own members and the belief states of the members of another group. 
As such, it looks like GEW is in tension with the aggregation model of group belief. 
We can think of at least two ways of responding to this worry. First, we might deny that 
GEW conflicts with the aggregation model of group belief by saying that peer groups merge 
into a single group upon revising their beliefs in light of a mutual disagreement. The viability 
of this proposal obviously depends on one’s view about how groups are individuated, and we 
do not want to take a stance on this issue here. However, we suspect that most collective 
epistemologists will resist the claim that whenever two peer groups revise their beliefs in light 
to a mutual disagreement, the groups will inevitably merge into a single combined group. 
After all, the groups need not jointly satisfy any of the criteria that are typically used to 
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individuate groups (see, e.g., List 2005 and Pettit 2010): they need not have a common aim or 
goal, and they need not display any structural or organizational unity. So it might not be a 
promising strategy to deny that there is a tension between GEW and the standard aggregation 
model of group belief. 
The second option is to grant that GEW is in conflict with the aggregation model of group 
belief, but instead take this to show that the aggregation framework needs to be revised to 
allow for a group’s belief state to depend partly on the belief states of individuals outside the 
group. We actually find this view of group belief independently quite plausible. For example, 
it seems that the board of a corporation may well decide to let its judgment on some matter 
depend in part on the judgment of a disinterested party outside of the corporation. Similarly, 
nothing seems to prevent a scientific research group from asking a colleague from another 
research group to analyze a data set, and include his or her analysis in the overall assessment 
of the data. So we find it at least prima facie reasonable to base GEW on a version of the 
aggregation framework that allows for group beliefs to depend partly on the beliefs of non-
members. 
4.6 Sixth objection: GEW puts groups in a doxastically unstable position 
Another notable property of GEW is that it advises disagreeing peer groups to revise their 
beliefs in a way that does not affect the belief states of their members. The belief revision is 
instead brought about by a change of BAF together with an extension of the set of individual 
belief states on which the BAF is used. Yet, it is natural to think that the members of two 
disagreeing peer groups should (at least sometimes) revise their beliefs. After all, how could a 
proponent of the Equal Weight Dictum maintain that individuals should always revise their 
beliefs in the face of individual peer disagreement, but never revise their beliefs in the face of 
group peer disagreement? 
Yet, if the members of two disagreeing peer groups should (at least sometimes) revise 
their beliefs about the disputed proposition, the worry arises that groups who comply with 
GEW will end up in a doxastically unstable position. For suppose that two disagreeing peer 
groups revise their beliefs in accordance with GEW, and suppose that their group members 
likewise revise their individual beliefs in the appropriate manner (whatever the appropriate 
manner might be). It then follows that the resulting group beliefs will not be an aggregation 
of the members’ resulting beliefs, but rather an aggregation of the members’ initial beliefs. 
Thus, it looks like the groups will have to revise their beliefs a second time in order to stay “up 
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to date” with their members’ beliefs. Doesn’t this show that GEW cannot be the whole story 
about how groups should revise their beliefs in the face of group peer disagreement? 
We think it is clearly right that the members of two disagreeing peer groups should 
sometimes revise their beliefs about the disputed proposition. Also, it might well be that, in 
such cases, the disagreeing groups should make belief revisions that go beyond those advised 
by GEW. However, it seems to us that such additional requirements should not be accounted 
for by a theory group peer disagreement. To see why, note that two peer groups may well 
disagree even if none of their members are aware of the disagreement. Suppose, for instance, 
that two peer groups each hire an outside spokesperson to make a revision decision on behalf 
of the group upon having met with the other group’s spokesperson. In this sort of case, none 
of the group members will know whether the groups disagree or not, and hence cannot be 
expected to revise their beliefs. We take this to show that it is not an essential part of a group 
peer disagreement that the group members should revise their beliefs about the disputed 
proposition. Accordingly, we find it misguided to require of a theory of group peer 
disagreement that it be able to account for how the members of two disagreeing peer groups 
should revise their beliefs in cases where such a revision is called for. This is simply the job of 
another theory. 
4.7 Seventh objection: GEW is overly idealized 
The seventh worry centers on the fact that GEW has been developed to handle fairly idealized 
cases of group peer disagreement in which each group possesses the following three pieces of 
information about both groups: (i) the group’s BAF, (ii) the group’s belief profile, and (iii) 
the group’s reliability profile. But disagreeing peer groups obviously need not possess this 
much information about each other. In fact, it seems likely that most realistic cases of group 
peer disagreement will involve some degree of uncertainty about (i)-(iii). This raises the worry 
that GEW is only applicable to a very limited range of cases. 
While we will not attempt to generalize GEW in any systematic fashion here, we would 
like to illustrate how GEW may be applied in its current form to cases of group peer 
disagreement in which there is uncertainty about (i)-(iii). One might consider a whole range 
of cases corresponding to different stocks of information that disagreeing peer groups might 
have about each other, but here we will focus on a case in which the groups are deprived of 
any information about the other group’s belief profile: 
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Underdetermined Belief Profiles: Two peer groups G1 and G2 disagree about a 
proposition p: G1 believes p, and G2 believes ~p. G1 and G2 both use majority voting on 
100 equally reliable members (with a reliability of more than 50 %). G1 has a large 
majority in favor of p: 95 of G1’s members believe p. By contrast, G2 has a small majority 
in favor of ~p: only 55 of G2’s members believe ~p. G1 knows that G2 is a peer, that G2 
disagrees about p, that G2 uses majority voting, and that G2 has a uniform reliability 
profile. Likewise, G2 knows that G1 is a peer, that G1 disagrees with G2 about p, that G1 
uses majority voting, and that G1 has a uniform reliability profile. 
How should G1 and G2 revise their beliefs about p in order to comply with GEW? The groups 
are obviously not in a position to determine with certainty which set of beliefs the optimal 
BAF for the combined group (which is majority voting, since the reliability profile in the 
combined group is uniform) should be used on, since they do not know each other’s belief 
profiles. So GEW does not deliver a verdict in the same straightforward manner as it does in 
the kinds of cases discussed so far. 
Nevertheless, we think that GEW can be used to reach a reasonable verdict in 
Underdetermined Belief Profile. As a first step, let us distinguish three mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive scenarios that are compatible with G1’s information about G2. In the first scenario, 
more than 95 of G2’s members believe ~p, in which case G1 should adopt a belief that ~p upon 
disagreement. In the second scenario, precisely 95 of G2’s members believe ~p, in which case 
G1 should suspend judgment about p upon disagreement. In the third scenario, less than 95 
of G2’s members believe ~p, in which case G1 should retain its belief that p upon disagreement. 
Now, the third scenario is clearly more probable than the two first scenarios in light of G1’s 
lack of information about G2’s belief profile. So if G1 is to use GEW to reach a reasonable 
revision decision, G1 should retain its belief that p upon disagreement. 
Likewise, we can distinguish three mutually exclusive and exhaustive scenarios that are 
compatible with G2’s information about G1. In the first scenario, more than 55 of G1’s 
members believe p, in which case G2 should adopt a belief that p upon disagreement. In the 
second scenario, precisely 55 of G1’s members believe p, in which case G2 should suspend 
judgment about p upon disagreement. In the third scenario, less than 55 of G1’s members 
believe p, in which case G2 should retain its belief that ~p upon disagreement. Here the first 
scenario is much more probable than the second and third scenario in light of G2’s lack of 
information about G1’s belief profile. So if G2 is to use GEW to reach a reasonable revision 
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decision, G2 should adopt a belief that p upon disagreement. Thus, while we have developed 
GEW with an eye to cases of group peer disagreement in which there is no uncertainty about 
(i)-(iii), we think there is a natural way of extending the view to less idealized cases. 
5. Summary 
We began this paper by exploring what it means for two groups to face a mutual peer 
disagreement insofar as we accept the aggregation model of group belief. A notable outcome 
of this investigation was that differing beliefs profiles is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
group disagreement, and that differing reliability profiles is likewise neither necessary nor 
sufficient for group peerhood. Both of these results followed from the fact that a group’s belief 
and reliability is a function not only of its belief profile and reliability profile, but also of its 
belief aggregation function. This is why there is no direct connection between group 
disagreement/peerhood and member disagreement/peerhood on the present picture. 
We went on to evaluate three different views of group peer disagreement that one might 
take to cohere with the equal weight view of individual peer disagreement. The view that 
seemed most promising to us says that the parties to a group peer disagreement should adopt 
the belief that results from applying the optimal belief aggregation function for the combined 
group on the combined group. We showed that this view implies that whether or not two 
disagreeing peer groups should revise their beliefs in a uniform manner depends on specific 
details about the groups’ reliability distributions and belief distributions. As such, the 
proposed view implies that sometimes only one of the parties to a group peer disagreement 
should revise its initial belief, and other times both parties to a group peer disagreement 
should revise their initial beliefs. Another notable implication of the proposed view is that the 
parties to a group peer disagreement should revise their beliefs in a way that depends solely 
on the beliefs and reliabilities of the group members, and not on those of the groups. We 
argued that, although puzzling at first sight, this result is ultimately desirable, since a group’s 
belief and reliability is partly determined by an epistemically irrelevant factor, namely the 
group’s belief aggregation function. 
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